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# EASTERN

F.O. 371

1948

PALESTINE

FILE No. .....4

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PALLOTINE

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E3636/4/31

TELEGRAM FROM United Kingdom

Delgation NEW YORK

907 Top Secret 17th Mar 18th " in Registry

Last Paper.

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References.

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(Action completed.) (Index.

Next Paper!

1655

Permanent Members Committee.

Refers New York t legram No, 906 E3628/4/31) 4/7/1
Austin informed that replies received from Arab states and Jewish Agency as to whether they would use their influence to bring about an immediate truce in Palestine, were, Arab states and Higher Committee would agree provided Partition plan was suspended, Jewish Agency would consult their people in Palestine. Reference United States Trusteeship plan member of their delegation expressed view that since it involved suspension of Assembly plan Arabs could be induced to acceptit as a "third Choice" failing immediate establishment of a unitary state.

(Minutes.)

J.B. Mon 18/3

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30471 F.O.P

Per treat as top copy

[E 3636]

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET DISTRIBUTION

### FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No.907
17th March, 1948.
R. 3. 10 a.m. 17th March, 1948.
R. 3. 10 a.m. 18th March, 1948.

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington
British Middle East Office Cairo

TAMEDIATE
TOP SECRET
LIGHT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 907 of 17th March repeated for information to Jerusalem, Washington and B.M.E.O.Cairo.

My immediately preceding telegram and my telegram No. 891.

Palestine.

Austin informed me at meeting this morning that in reply to enquiry by four powers to representatives of Jewish Agency and Arab states as to whether they would agree to use their influence to bring about an immediate truce in Palestine, Jewish Agency representatives had replied that they must consult their people in Palestine, on whom physical consequences would fall. Arab states and Arab Higher Committee had indicated that they would agree to use their influence as suggested provided partition plan was suspended.

2. With regard to United States Trusteeship plan outlined in my immediately preceding telegram, a member of United States delegation expressed the view that since it involved suspension of Assembly plan Arabs could be induced to accept it as a "third choice" i.e. failing immediate establishment of a unitary or federal state.

Please repert important to Jerusalem and B.M.E.O. Cairo as my telegrams Nos. 226 and 13 respectively.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalam. Repeated to B.M.E.O. Cairo]

[Copy sent to M.E.Secretariat]

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1948	PALESTINE	19 MAR 1948
Registry Number E3655/4/31  TELEGRAM FROM  United Kingdom No. Delegation NEW YORK Dated 912  TOP SECRET.  in Registry 18th Mar 19th "	Permanent Members draft report to Sacurity Council  Refers New York telegram No, 908 of 17th Mar ((£3629/4/31) Word "four" in first sentence should "three". Understands from United States delegate that Soviet delegation have so far been informed only of gist of first nine paragraphs of telegram under reference and have not yey clarified their attitude. Hopes further information on this point shortly.	
Last Paper. 3636  References.	(Minutes	H3. 19/3
(Print.)  (How disposed of.)  8, Malkus and & V  Alexan Eab My  Ichem M1.5  M.1.3a  M04		
(Action completed.)  (Action completed.)  Next Paper.	30471 F.O.F	

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DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

# FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 912. March 18th, 1948.

D. 11.11.a.m. March 18th, 1948. R. 5.31.p.m. March 18th, 1948.

Repeated to Jerusalem.

Washington.

B.M. E.O. Cairo.

E\_3655

MOST IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET

19 MAR 1948

LIGHT

Addressed Foreign Office telegram 912 March 18th, repeated for information to Jerusalem, Washington and B.M.E.O. Cairo.

My telegram 908: Palestine.

Word "four" in first sentence should read "three".

2. I understand from United States delegation that Soviet delegation have so far been informed only of the gist of first nine (repeat nine) paragraphs in my telegram under reference and have not yet clarified their attitude. I hope for further information on this point shortly.

Foreign Office please repeat to Jerusalem and British Middle East Office Cairo as my telegrams 229 and 16 respectively both Immediate.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat.
[Repeated to British Middle East Office Cairo]
[Copy sent to Cypher Section, Commonwealth
Relations Department, for repetition to
Jerusalem.]

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DIPLOMATIC SECRET DISTRIBUTION

# FROM NEW YORK TO FOR IGN OFFICE

No. 915
D. 3. 48 p.m. 18th March, 1948
R. 10. 25 p.m. 18th March, 1948.

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington
British Middle East Office dairo 3556

MOST IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET
LIGHT

19 MAR 1948

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 915 of March 18th repeated to Jerusalem Washington and B.M.E.O Cairo for information

My telegrams No. 908 and 912.

#### Palestine

Ross of United States delegation informed us this morning that following modifications have been made in draft in my first telegram under reference with object of making it more acceptable to Gromyko.

- 2. Draft has been divided into two sections under Roman numerals I and II: I includes present paragraphs 1 8 and II includes remaining paragraphs, renumbered as 1 4. In the first paragraph of draft, for "conclusions" read "facts". In paragraph 5, delete last sentence (this is a State Department suggestion not yet adopted by United States delegation). In paragraph II 1 (formerly 9) read "find and report that a continuation of the infiltration into Palestine by land and by sea of groups and persons with the purpose of taking part in violence would aggravate still further the situation, and recommend" etc. Sub-paragraph (B) of same paragraph now reads "that the Security Council... to bring about the immediate cessation of violence and the restoration of peace and order in Palestine".
- Despite suggested modifications Gromyko (who has not (repeat not) yet seen last three paragraphs of draft) was unwilling yesterday to accept revised text because it did not declare an immediate threat to peace and because and because he was suspicious as to effect on Jewish immigration of passage about "infiltration of hostile elements". Intention of United States Delegation is however that they, together with French and Chinese, should

/ this evening 19

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# U.K. Del. New York telegram No. 915 to Foreign Office

-2-

this evening present whole (remeat whole) draft as now revised to Gromyko, and say that in view of urgency of situation they feel that some proposals must be forthcoming from permanent members at Council meeting tomorrow, and that while they hope for his concurrence in the draft they will in any case present it at the meeting as from themselves. They do not expect Gromyko to agree to last three paragraphs, and Ross agreed with me that Gromyko will most probably ask for time to consider his attitude when proposals are put forward in the Council.

- Learn our attitude if possible before tomorrow's meeting and in general to receive maximum possible cooperation from His Majesty's Government. Their hope is that a special Assembly can be called under their plan soon enough to enable details of trusteeship scheme to be worked out before May 15th (sub paragraph (B) of my telegram No. 909 which records comments made by Rusk to Trafford Smith at a working group of United States, French and Chinese experts which latter attended in the capacity of observer). You will recall that under rules 7 and 9 of Assembly rules of procedure an interval of 15 days must elapse between request for a special session by the Security Council and su moning of that session.
- 5. I told Ross that I could not guarantee that I should be authorised to support United States proposals, and I shall not (repeat not) attend meeting this evening at which draft is to be presented to Gromyko. I also pointed out that words "the permanent members" at the beginning of paragraph II 1 (formerly 9) of the draft should be amended so as to refer to the three or four permanent members (i.e. excluding ourselves) as the case may be. On the other hand, subject to your views I so not see any similar objection to the phrase "the permanent members" in the first paragraph of all, since it merely intoduces findings of fact in paragraphs 1 8.
- 6. I should be grateful for your earliest possible comments on United States proposals and in any case for an indication of line I should take in Security Council, which should reach me not later than 9 a.m. New York time tomorrow, March 19th.

Please repeat immediate to Jerusalem and important to B.m.E.O. Caire as my telegrams Nos 230 and 17 respectively.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem. Repeated to B.M.B.O.]

[Copy sent to M.E.Secretariat]

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FROM H W YORK TO FORMIGH FRICE

20 MAR 1948

(From United Fin dom Delegation to United Mations)

D.10.25 p.m. 19th March, 1948 R. 5.35 a.m. 20th March, 1948 No.931 19th Arch, 1948

Repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Tashington.

Addressed to Foreign Cifice telegram No.931 of March 19th, repeated for information to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

My telegram No.915.

Palestine.

Austin (United States) reported to Security Council this norning result of consultations between the permament members. Agreement had been reached between China, France and the United States, the Soviet delegate would no doubt make his position clear. He then read report substantially identical with text in my telegram No. 908 as amended by my telegram under reference but omitting last three paragraphs.

- 2. Gromyko criticised Austin's speech on the lines that results of consultations would have been more significant if they had been directed towards the definite end of carrying out partition rather than side-tracked into consideration of possible modification of General Assembly plan. He rehearsed familiar arguments again t further consultation with Jewish Agency, Arab Higher Committee, Mandatory Power and Palestine Commission. United States efforts in this direction had resulted simply in further delay. Soviet Union could not be associated with any proposal to reopen Palestine question overtly or covertly. In their view, task before the Council was to implement Assembly resolution and any ides of deviatin from it must be rejected.
- 3. Syrian delegate (Paris Bey) then made a short statement on behalf of Syria and Arab States amplifying that reported in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 900 with following points:
- (a) Arabs eagerly desired peace with justice in Palestine and were ready to use all possible means to that end.
- (b) Partition slan and any activity in the way of implementing it were sole causes of present acts of violence

there. When

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there. Then there causes were removed, law and order would automatically be restored.

- 4. The Jews (reris Bey continued) were receiving heavy reinforcements of men in monthly immigration quota together with shipments of munitions from all over Lurope. Arabs were deprived of these privileges. If Jewish terrorists were disarmed, Arabs would willingly disarm and would be ready to co-operate in finding peaceful democratic solution guaranteeing liberties of all.
- 5. As regards consultations between permanent members, they should have realised that General Assembly's plan could not be put into effect without use of force, and that Security Council was not empowered to use force. As regards part II paragraph 1 of United States Report, permanent members should realise that they were not dealing with armies but with warring sections of the same population. Appeals to cease fire would be ineffective unless causes of hostility were removed. He pointed out that the Assembly had no power to delegate authority to the Commission to take over the Government of Palestine, since Trusteeship (which did not apply to Palestine) was the only conceivable way in which Assembly could exercise administrative authority.
- 6. Chairman (Tsiang) speaking on behalf of Chinese delegation said that United States report had his full concurrence. Chinese delegation had been responsible for inclusion of reference to incursions and infiltration "by land and sea". Paramount object was to privent a threat to the peace from developing and to this end both parties aunt co-operate in stopping the accumulation of aris and manpower.
- 7. Jewish Agency representative (Silver) said that he assumed United States report was introductory to resolutions to be introduced later and Agency would reserve final judgement until resolutions were known.
- 8. As regards the report, part I paragraph 4: If "under present conditions" were emphasised, the Agency could agree. Reason why the Assembly plan could not be percefully implemented was the failure of the Arab States to observe the Charter and their attempt to counter the Assembly's decision by force. R ferences to incursions of srmed elements by see as well as by land were inaccurate. The Landatory Power had not (repeat not) confirmed these incursions. Immigrants were not armed and in any case it was entirely wrang to equate Arab and Jewish infiltratio .

9. Faris Bey

Reference:	S Reference:
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#### New York telegram No.931 to F.O.

- 3 -

9. Faris Bey then entered a protest against the Jewish charge that the Arab States were breaking their pledges under the Charter.

10. Council thereupon adjourned for further consultation among permanent members. See my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass important to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 252.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Officer for repetition to Jerusalem].

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM MESS YORK TO FORE IGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No.935
19th March, 1948
R. 7.30 a.m. 20th March, 1948

Repeated to Jerusalem and Washington.

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GIANT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.933 19th March, repeated for information to Jerusalem and Washington.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Palestine.


Following is text of U.S.A. statement:

- "1. The plan proposed by the General Assembly is an integral plan which cannot succeed unless each of its parts can be carried out. There seems to be general agreement that the plan cannot now be implemented by peaceful means.
- 2. We believe that further steps must be taken immediately not only to maintain the peace but also to afford a further opportunity to reach an agreement between the interested parties regarding the future Government of Palestine. To this end we believe that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. Such a United Nations Trusteeship would be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned or to the character of the eventual political settlement, which we hope can be achieved without long delay. In our opinion the Security Council should recommend the establishment of such a trusteeship to the General Assembly and to the mandatory power. This would require an immediate special session of the General Assembly which the Security Council should request the Secretary General to convoke under Article 20 of the charter.
- Fending the meeting of the proposed special session of the General Assembly we believe that the Security Council should instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the proposed partition plan".

Foreign Office please pass important to Jerusalem as my telegram To.234.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetation to Jerusalem].

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

#### FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 1246 20th March, 1948.

D. 4.15 p.m. 20th Harch, 1948.

Repeated to Washington No. 3204


MOST IMMEDIATE
SECRET
GIANT

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram No. 1246 of 20th March repeated for information to Washington.

I should welcome your immediate advice on the procedural problems arising out of the latest American proposal on Palestine.

- 2. Senator Austin's proposals are now before the Security Council and I presume that they will be veteed by the Soviet Union, who will thereby prevent the Security Council from superseding the original General Assembly decision. I am not clear what happens next. Will there be a resolution in the Security Council that it cannot take any further action? Or will the latest report of the Palestine Commission be taken by the Security Council with a special vote upon it? Would this in turn be regarded as a precedural matter, and, if so, would the result be that the United States Government would call for a new General Assembly? Alternatively, is the United States Government likely to cut through all these possible sources of delay by asking the Secretary General at once to consult the members of the United Nations with a view to convening a new General Assembly?
- 3. I should also be grateful for any information about the reactions of the members of the Palestine Commission to Senator Austin's proposal.
- 4. The Cabinet are considering this question on Monday morning, March 22nd, and I should therefore be grateful for a reply to this telegram by tomerrow evening, March 21st.

FFFF



8, P.P. G. C1.95. Mar 22

Next Paper.

(Action completed.)

E\_3700

United States proposal for a Trusteeship Council for Palestine.

PALESTINE

Refers New York telegram No, 934, Rusk told Jebb that the United States propps at for a United Nations Trusteeship for Palestine would be on following lines: Transmits list of same.

(Minutes.)

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#### FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 936 19th March, 1948.

D. 11. 55 p.m. 19th March, 1948. R. 7. 20 a.m. 20th March, 1948.

Repeated to Washington Jerusalem

IMMEDIATE SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 936 of March 19th repeated for information to Washington and Jerusalem.

My telegram No. 934. 1978,

Palestine.

Rusk told Jebb this afternoon that the United States proposal for a U.N. trusteeship for Palestine would be on the following lines.

- (a) A "neutral" Governor should be selected by the Trusteeship Council and given wide powers subject to general directions to be issued by the Trusteeship Council.
- (b) The Administration should then be selected by the Governor.
- (c) The Administration should be assisted by an Advisory Council on which presumably both Arabs and Jews would be represented.
- (d) The Administration would have inter alia power to collect taxes and maintain order. If insufficient money was raised locally the United Nations would have to supply the deficit.
- (e) For maintaining internal order the Governor would recruit a police force (apparently persons from outside Palestine could be recruited). If however this police force was insufficient to maintain order the Governor would be authorised to appeal to three permanent members of the Security Council - namely the United States the United Kingdom and France - to provide the necessary forces. The reason why these three powers would be selected

/ was because they ....


was because they represented the allied and associated powers who had figured in the constitution of the original mandate.

- (f) Though this was not definite it seems that in the event of an appeal the three powers would have to supply forces in equal proportions.
- Rusk then made a strong appeal for British support for a plan on these general lines, He said that the scheme proposed would at least keep the Russians out of Palestine except to the extent that they might participate in the control of the trust if they should elect to join the Trusteeship Council. Jebb confined himself to asking questions in order to get the American position clear. He thus enquired whether in the American view, if His Majesty's Government backed up the proposed scheme, they would still be able to maintain their proposed dates for evacuation. Rusk did not answer this question directly but said something to the effect that he supposed that the British withdrawal would have to be "phased". Jebb had the distinct impression however that the American hope was to get a Governor installed before May 15th, who would then appeal for assistance to the three powers, which would in turn mean that any British troops then in the country would have to stay and some would no doubt have to return along (it is to be supposed) with the Americans and French (Rusk at one stage employed the word "marines").

Foreign Office please pass important to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 237.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

222



20 E 3701 PALESTINE 348 22 MAR

#### United States Trusteeship Proposit.

Refers Foreigh Office telegram No, 1246. Agrees the Gromyko will probably veto all parts of United States Proposal and that if question is raised of whether decision to request a special session is procedural he will "double veto" to defeat it. Alternatively he may possibly adopt the line that
Palestine is a "strategic area" and that Security Council is alone competent to approve terms of trusteeship under article 83(1) of the Charter without intervention of Assembly.

(Minutes.)

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#### FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 944 20th March, 1948.

D. 4.42 p.m. 20th march, 1948. R. 11.30 p.m. 20th march, 1948.

Repeated to Washington

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E 3/01

22 MAR 1948

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 924 of March 20th repeated for information to Washington.

Your telegram No. 1246.

Palestine

I agree that Gromyko will probably veto all parts of United States proposal and that if question is raised of whether decision to request a special session is procedural he will use "double veto" to defeat it.

- 2. Alternatively Gromyko may possibly adopt the line that Palestine is a "strategic area" and that Security Council is alone competent to approve terms of trusteeship under Article 83 (1) of the Charter without intervention of Assembly. But this would be easy to vote down (since inter alia Assembly's consent will presumably be required for abandonment of its plan) and it is unlikely that he would in fact take this line as his whole position is founded on sanctity of Assembly resolution.
- 3. If United States proposal is vetoed and no other proposals are forthcoming case will presumably be dropped from Council's agenda which according to precedent could take place by a procedural vote. I do not expect that Council will feel obliged to take separate action on Commissions second report but if it did this would presumably consist merely of taking note.

4. As suggested in paragraph 2 of your telegram under reply I think that if Gromyko attempted to veto request for a special session United States Government would immediately have recourse to alternative procedure of securing concurrence of a simple majority of members of the United Nations. Under Assembly rules of procedure (rules 7 and 9) session could them, be held ten days after such concurrence was obtained

/which might be

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which might be almost as speedy a procedure as request by Council. For this reason I think it possible that Gromyko would content himself in Council with abstaining on request for a special session. It seems unlikely in any case that United States Government would try to bypass Council in this matter unless and until they are confronted with a veto.

5. As rejards reactions of Commission (your paragraph 3) I understand that they were (like the Jewish Igency representatives) not informed of United States proposals till the last moment. I do not yet know how the news has struck them except that Bunche intimated to Fletcher-Cooke this morning that they were not taking much interest in pursuing detailed arrangements concerning Palestine. Federspiel has suggested to a member of my staff that Commission might turn into the governing authority for Palestine under a trusteeship plan but I doubt whether this reflects considered view of his colleagues nor does it seem to square with United States views as outlined by Rusk to Jebb (my telegram No. 936).

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PALESTINE

1948

Delegation NEW YORK

932

19th March 22nd "

E 3710 MAR 1948

nUnited States Trusteeship Proposal for Palestine.

Refers New York telegram No, 931 (3698/4/31)
United States delegation did not after all present
their proposal for a trusteeship over Palestine to
Soviet delegation on March 18th as French delegation had not yet received instructions.
Gives text of further discussions between Permanent
Menbers held during mid-day recess March 19th

(Minutes.)

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#### FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGH OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 932 19th March, 1948

D. 10.58 p.m. 19th March, 1948 R. 7.20 a.m. 20th March, 1948

Repeated to Jerusalem Washington

[ 3710

IMMEDIATE
SECRET
GIANT

22 MAR 1948

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 932 of 19th March repeated for information to Jerusalem and Washington.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Palestine.

United States delegation did not after all present their proposal for a trusteeship over Palestine to Soviet delegation on March 18th as French delegation had not yet received instructions. During mid-day recess on March 19th however meeting of permanent members took place (which I thought it as well to attend subject to usual reservation of my position) at which Senator Austin read out statement contained in my immediately following telegram and invited comments. He expressed the hope that Chinese representative would present proposals therein on behalf of the permanent members whereupon he (Austin) would make a supporting statement.

- 2. Gromyko's reply was that he could not consent directly or indirectly to any such alteration of Assembly plan and would have to get instructions before he could comment further on United States proposal.
- 3. Chinese representative (Tsiang) said that United Nations should not promote partition plan since it would clearly lead to war in present circumstances and that some alternative solution must therefore be found. His Government had not thought of the trusteeship solution but had no alternative to offer though it was possible that other members of the Council might.
- 4. Parodi (France) said that trusteeship proposal must be considered carefully as it might lead to legal difficulties e.g., in regard to "States directly concerned". He also thought it important not to give the Arabs the impression that they were going to get all they wanted. He thought, however, that his Government would support the proposal.
- 5. Secretary General interposed to say that idea of a trusteeship for Palestine had been considered by U.N.S.C.O.P.

/ which had, however,

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which had, however, come to the conclusion that it would involve a still more difficult task of enforcement than partition. He did not wish to influence discussion but enquired of the permanent members whether they would be prepared to keep the peace in Palestine in the event of a new decision being reached by the Security Council or the Assembly. To this Austin replied that his Government would "of course" be ready to back up a United Nations decision.

- 6. As Chinese representative asked for my views I said that I would of course consult my Government on the proposal but, recalling statements already made on their behalf concerning their attitude to the implementation of the General Assembly's plan, I did not think they would be prepared to express any opinion as to the merits of any suggested departure from that plan.
- 7. United States representative emphasised the need to avoid a legal vacuum after May 15th which would turn Palestine into a "non-self-governing territory" within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. He also spoke of urgency of finding a solution if possible within the peaceful settlement provisions of the Charter.
- 8. For record of afternoon session of Council which followed see my telegram No. 934.

Foreign Office please pass Important to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 233.

[Copy sent to Telegram Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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E 3711

22 MAR 1948)

1948

PALESTINE

Registry | E3711/4/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Mr. Houston
Boswall

Dated Received

in Registry?

BEIRUT 209

209 19th Mar 22nd " Statement by Anzam Pasha on Palestine.

Refers Beirut telegram No, 204, (3635/4/31)
Text of statement made by Azzam Pasha on March 18th who said that the Political Committee has discussed varius aspects of the Palestine question and is of the opimion that it is desirable that the Arab Higher Committee should submit to the Security Council such statements and information as that body might request but only on the basis of the rejection of partition and the non-recognition of Jewish State in Palestine.

Last Paper.

37/0

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

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Mor 22

(Minutes.)

This was not really on authoritative Pres release. See £ 3736.

Includes an important statement that the arch States will and invail Palertine unders others do. This is presented, however, in the form not of a Declaration of policy but of an authoritative opinion only. And su also Design, parc 2.

GLMD. 30/3. Paid the reme thing in the Egyptime Best Security Council.

HT3. 227

B97423

(Action (Index.)

Next Paper.

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#### POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION

### FROM BETRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Houstoun Boswell.
No. 209.

D. 6.41. p.m. 19th Merch 1948.

19th Merch 1948.

R. 9.14. p.m. 19th Merch 1948.

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York,

Jerusalem,
B.M.E.O.
Damascus, Saving.
Cairo,
Bagdad,

E\_3711

Jedds,
Amman.

22 MAR 1948

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 209 of Merch 19th repeated to U.K. Delegation New York, Jerusalem, B.M.E.O. and Saving to Damascus, Cairo, Bagdad, Jedda, Amman.

My telegram No. 204. Palestine; Arab League Political Committee.

Following is a translation of statement made by Azzam Pasha on March 18th as published in the local press.

2. The Political Committee has discussed various aspects of the Palestine question and is of the opinion that it is desirable that the Arab Higher Committee should submit to the Security Council such statements and information as that body might request but only on the basis of the rejection of partition and the non-recognition of Jewish State in Palestine. The Political Committee having also considered United Nations' request to the representatives of the Arab States at Lake Success to restore calm in Palestine, is of the opinion that absolutely no threat to peace exists in Palestine at present and that it is not the intention of the Arab States to interfere in Palestine by force unless some foreign state should decide to interfere by force for the purpose of applying partition and assisting Zionists there. The present disturbances in Palestine are merely a local dispute arising from the United Nations decision for the partition of Palestine. It is the policy of the Arab States to keep this dispute within its narrow limits.

SMAR 1848

Foreign Office please pass to U.K. Delegation New York as my telegram No. 4 and to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 34.

[Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York and copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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E 3734 PALESTINE MAR 1948

Security Council Meetings.

Refers New York telegram No, 932 (3710/4/31)
Sir A Cadogan spoke first at afternoon session of
Security Council, to make it clear that "permanent
Members" at beginning of part two of United States
report did not include the United Kingdom.

Reports afternoon debates Reports afternoon debates .

(Minutes.)

Dr. efm 21/3 HB. 229

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Next Paper.

En Clair

# WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

# FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 934.

D: 11.08 p.m. 19th March, 1948.

19th March, 1948.

R: 6.05 a.m. 20th March, 1948.

Repeated to: Jerusalem, Washington Saving.

E 3734

DANDIAGE

GIANT

22 MAR 1948

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 934 March 19th repeated for information to Jerusalem and Washington Saving.

My telogram No. 932.

Palestine.

At afternoon session of Security Council I spoke first to make clear that "permanent members" at beginning of Part II of United States report did not include the United Kingdom in view of the position consistently taken up by His Majesty's Government.

- 2. Egyptian representative (Fawzi) subscribed to statements made by Syrian delegate. He had no quarrel with United States report and appreciated attitude of French and Chinese delegations but must register disappointment that it did not recognise Zionist aggression. He disagreed with attitude of Soviet representative. Security Council must not become a rubber stamp. Issue was one of fundamental human rights, self-defence and self-determination. Arabs were wnoleheartedly dedicated to the preservation of order.
- 3. Austin said that United States accepted Jewish Agency's interpretation of paragraph 4 of Part 1 of report (my telegram No. 931 paragraph 9). As regards reference to incursions "by land and sea", he read by way of justification questions and answers Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 in P/NY/44. Reference in Part II, to which Jewish representative took exception, to "groups and persons with the purpose of taking part in violence" did not apply to legal Jewish immigrants including those from Cyprus.
- 4. Turning to paragraph of Council's resolution of March 5th regarding "guidance and instructions which Council might usefully give to Palestine Commission with a view of implementing resolution of General Assembly", Austin summarised present position of Palestine Commission, Mandatory Power, Jews and Palestine Arabs. Status of Palestine on May 15th would be equivocal since

/(a) United Kingdom 📈



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# New York telegram No. 934 to Foreign Office.

- 2 -

- (a) United Kingdom was responsible under Article 5 of Mandate for seeing that no Palestine territory should be ceded or in any way placed under the control of any foreign power, and
- (b) United Nations did not automatically fall heir to responsibilities either of League of Nations or of Mandatory Power. Charter contained provision for voluntary placing of Mandate under trusteeship system, but no such proposal had been made by Mandatory in respect to Palestine and no action taken by United Nations which would have that result. Unilateral decision by United Mingdom to terminate Mandate could not automatically commit United Nations to responsibility for governing Palestine. On facts reported by permanent members, Palestine would be a land falling under Chapter XI of Charter, a non-self-governing territory. Limited responsibilities of United Nations set forth in Assembly plan depended upon adoption and implementation of plan as a whole.
- 5. Security Council was not prepared to implement plan in existing situation and was faced with clear evidence that Jews, Palestine Arabs and Mandatory Power cannot agree to implementation of plan through peaceful means. In this situation determination of Mandatory Power to leave on May 15th would result in chaos and heavy fighting. United Mations could not permit t is result.
- 6. United States subscribed to conclusion of permanent members that Council should make clear its determination not to permit situation to threaten international peace, and should take further action by all means available to it to bring about immediate cessation of violence and restoration of peace and order in Palestine. Under Charter, Council had both inescapable responsibility and full authority to take steps, if necessary using all its powers under Articles 39, 40, 41 and 42.
- 7. Finally, United States Government believed that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established under Trusteeship Council. This proposal was elaborated in terms of paragraphs 2 and 3 of my telegram No. 933.
- 8. See my two following telegrams.

Foreign Office please pass Important to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 235.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

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Next Paper.

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F Om Man YORL TO FORSIGE OFFICE.

(From United Mingdom Delegation to United Sations,.

0. 955. **1**9th march, 1948.

D. 11.55 p.m. 19th Larch, 1948.
R. 5.50 a.m. 20th Larch, 1948.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Washington Saving.

22 MAR 1948

for information to Jerusalem and Mashington Saving.

y immediately preceding telegram.

ralestine.

Following Austin's speech, Silver, on behalf of Jewish gency, thanked him for his explanation of "by land and sea" and reiterated that mandatory powers had not (repeat not, confirmed introduction of arms or armed forces by sea. he proposed to discuss legal arguments advanced by united states later "at great length", also "that will-o-the-wisp, an agreed solution". . eanwhile agency reactions were that suspension of implementation of assembly plan and trusteeship proposals constituted a "shocking reversal of united states position" in view of frequent pleages by the united States representative, secretary of State and resident himself. Consequence would be increased violence in ralestine and an incalculable blow to prestige of united ations. United States volte-face in face of arab threats was a fateful capitulation". rgument as regards indivisibility of the plan was incorrect, since on october 28th Herschel Johnson had stated that "element of mutuality" would not necessarily be a factor, and setting-up of one state was not conditional on setting-up of the

rabs had always opposed any solution giving Jows their legitimate rights. Fartition plan represented minimum acceptable to Jews and any further sacrifices would have to be imposed on them by force. He hoped united hations would not follow example of andatory power in enforcing on Jews a regime of crippling restrictions. Jews would continue to stand by seambly resolution of Movember 29th and would do "eyerything dictated by considerations of national survival, justice and historic rights" to maintain their

Tsiang expressed agreement of Chinese delegation with United States proposals. my consideration of the problem must begin from question whether security Jouncil should apply force to

yovercome trab resistance to

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# New York telegram No. 930 to F.U.

-<u>2</u>-

should neither furnish nor authorise use of force, but should order a military truce, which could not be secured without simultaneous political truce. United Nations should not, by attempting to enforce a political settlement itself, cause a war.

4. Gromyko reiterated soviet position. He could not accept that there was "general agreement" that implementation by peaceful means was impossible, and saw nothing in common between present united States proposals and results of consultation between permanent members as expressed in the agreed conclusions (a) and (b) of paragraph I of part II of United States report. These conclusions remained the basis on which security Council should build concrete proposals for implementation of partition plan.

5. × Discussion was adjourned until mednesday morning March 24th.

Foreign Office please pass important to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 236.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section C.O. for repetition to Jerusalem].

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION

### FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Houstoun Boswall. D. 8.09.p.n. March 19th, 1948, No. 212. March 19th, 1948. R. 10.45.p.m. March 19th, 1948.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York. Jerusalem. British Middle East Office Cairo. Damascus.) Cairo. E 3736 Saving. Bagdad.

IMPORTANT.

22 MAR 1948

SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 212 of March 19th, repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Jerusalem, B.M.E.O. Cairo and Saving. Damascus, Cairo, Bagdad and Amman.

My telegram No. 209.

Amman.

Palestine; Arab League Political Committee.

Evans called on Azzam Pasha this afternoon and was informed that no authoritative declaration had been issued to Universal Press. Statement in my telegram under reference is therefore not entirely accurate. Position is as follows; the Arabs were being pressed by United States Government on two points.

- (1) That Arab Higher Committee representative in Lake Success should take part in United Nations proceedings and
- (2) That Arab Governments should ensure that conflict in Palestine should be localised.
- 2. Azzam Pasha stated that United States Government were between devil and the deep. They had given up any idea of enforcing partition (he had received assurance that United States forces would not (repeat not) be used for this purpose) and they were now attempting to secure partition by conciliation. Arab League Political Committee had decided that the wishes of United States

Government as regards

-2-

Government as regards (1) could be met and instructions had already been sent to Arab Higher Committee representative enabling him in close consultation with the Egyptian, Syrian and Lebanese delegates to engage in talks (he had previously only been authorised to make a statement to the Committee of Four) on the condition that discussion in no way concerned partition in any form. As regards (2) Arab representatives at Lake Success had been instructed to inform United States Government that in the view of Political Committee of Arab Committee disturbances in Palestine were purely local and that it was the policy of Arab Governments to keep them so. Arab Governments were therefore prepared to collaborate with United Nations for localisation of conflict and the best way this could be done would be by joint action for the prevention of illegal Jewish immigrants. Azzam Pasha said he hoped in this way it would be difficult [sic] for the United States Government to prevent the despatch to Palestine of an international force without provoking U.S.S.R.

3. Azzam Pasha also referred to the proposal which he said found some favour in United Nations circles that British administration in Palestine should be prolonged for a limited period (see my telegram No. 204). He personally favoured this (in fact he would have welcomed a British trusteeship for Palestine where Arab preoccupations were not with the immediate independence for that country but with the curbing of Zionist ambitions) and he thought that as a last resort the Arab Governments might also accept this.

Azzam Pasha said that the psychological moment had not yet come for the Arabs to put forward any definite proposals. This would only be possible when the Jews had given up all hope of establishing a Jewish state. Any proposals by the Arabs now would be useless even if pressure were brought on the Jews by the United Nations and by United States. At the appropriate time (when Jews might even be offered a Jewish State without danger to the Arabs) the Arabs would be prepared to accept a compromise i.e. when and if Zionist spirit had been well and thoroughly broken.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram 5.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York.]

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E 3742

PALESTINE

E3742/4/31 Number

TELEGRAM FROM

United Kingdom Delegation NEW YORK

Dated

105 Saving

Received in Registry i

19th Mar 22nd

Answers to questions put to Palestine Commission by Four Permanent Menbers.

Refers New York telegram No, 855 dated March 11th

(3359/4/31). Further to brief indications given in New York

telegram No, 882 trans mits full text of the answers submitted by the Palestine Commission.

Last Paper.

7736

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8. Waltwan El Werman bab off dolers, M.18 M.1.34 MOY admy a m

(Action completed.)

Mar 23

Next Paper.

3773

(Minutes.)

Contrary to expectations aroused by Jenish press propagand, this document does not atter complaints of British obstruction, but werely states calmly and objectively Shet the position is, with putitular relation to the Mandatory power's attitude.

D-Balfin

In dualing with purtion b, the bonnissian Jusumally felt unable & mention the assurance communicated to them in confidence of Six A. Cadogan, Chat if they came to Lenden H.M.G. would h prepared to examine with them the possibility of their arrival in Palistine earlier than the 1st May.

H-Becler

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En Clair [By confidential bag]

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DISTRIBUTION

#### FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 105 Saving

E 3742

19th March, 1948.

R. 20th March, 1948,

Repeated to H.C. Jerusalem No. 5 Saving Washington No. 1007 Saving

22 MAR 1948

#### CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 105 Saving of 19th March repeated for information to H.C. Jerusalem, Washington Saving.

My telegram No. 855 [of 11th March] repeated to Jerusalem No. 206 and to Washington No. 132.

# Questions by Four Permanent Members of the Security Council to the Palestine Commission.

Further to brief indications given in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 882 (to Jerusalem No. 213 and Washington No. 954 Saving), fellowing is full text of the answers submitted by the Palestine Commission.

[Begins].

Answer to <u>Question 1:</u>

The answer is no.

As pointed out in its two reports to the Security Council

- (a) the Jews of Palestine generally accept the Plan of Partition
- (b) the Arabs of Palestine generally oppose it and the Arab Higher Committee has refused to have anything to do with the Commission; and
- (c) the landatory Power declines any action which might be interpreted as involving implementation of the Plan.

For these reasons the Commission reported to the Security Council that it could not discharge its

/responsibilities on the

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#### New York telegram in. III wing to Fereign Office.

I.

responsibilities on the termination of the Mandate without the assistance of an adequate more Polestinian armed force for the preservation of law and more.

#### Answer to mestion I.

By the terms of the institution of the General Assembly on the future Government of Fall-Sine, the Commission has been charged exclusively with instance of the Security Council, for mutting into effect the recommendations of the Henrill Assembly as set forth in the Plan of Partition with Icanonic Imian. The Commission has operated strictly within these terms of reference, and is not, therefore, in a position to successful possible modifications in either the substance or the possible modifications in which might offer a basis for apprenent among the people of Palestine".

#### Answer to question I

Although the Commission was had no efficial communication from Arabs on the natter, the Commission is well aware that the basis of Arab disagreement is to be found in their objection to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine and to the continuation of Tewish immigration there.

#### Answer to uestim

The Palestine Commission notes not consider it possible to implement the Plan by practiful means either as a whole er in substantial part so Imm as the existing vigorous arab resistance to partition and the consider it possible.

#### Answer to mestion a.

The Commission has held in ther discussions with the Mandatory Power regarding the same as stated in the First Mandate, and the results are the same as stated in the First Manthly Report, namely, that the Handatory Power firmly intends to retain undivided remards in Palestine until the date of the termination of the Handate (i.e. 15th May, 1948).

### Answer to uestion d.

The Commission has noted that discussions with the Mandatory Power regarding the mate of arrival of the Commission in Palestine, and was received the fellowing reply to a specific question:

"His lajesty's Excemment in the United Kingdom would not regard favourably any proposal by the Commission to proceed to Palestine and two weeks before the date of the termination of the landate".

/enswer to ruestion 7.

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# New York telegram No. 105 Saving to Foreign Office.

3.

#### Answer to <u>Question 7.</u>

The Palestine Commission has given consideration to and has taken some preliminary steps regarding the establishment by 1st April 1948 of Provisional Councils of Government in the proposed Jewish and Arab States. With regard to the proposed Jewish State, it has sent communications of inquiry with regard to the consultations with "democratic parties and other public organisations" envisaged in paragraph 4, Section B, Part 1 of the Plan. It has also discussed the matter with the Mandatory Power. On this subject the Commission has reached the following conclusions and will communicate these conclusions to the Security Council in its second monthly report:

a. That the attitude of the Arab Higher Committee and Arab resistance in Palestine preclude any possibility of selecting a Provisional Council of Government for the proposed Arab State by 1st April.

b. That while the Commission can take and has in fact taken some preliminary steps toward the selection of the Previsional Council of Government for the proposed Jewish State, that Previsional Council will not be able to "carry out its functions," in the sense of the Plan, prior to the termination of the Mandate.

C. The position of the Mandatory Power as indicated in the reply to a question of the Commission set forth below, precludes any possibility of fulfilling by 1st April Part I, B, 4 of the Plan as regards either the Arab or the Jewish State.

The Commission had inquired.

"In what manner is the Mandatory Power, prior to the termination of the Mandate, to facilitate the work of the Commission respecting measures it must take to establish the Provisional Councils of Government?"

The Mandatory Power replied as follows:

"Subject to its everriding responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, the Mandatery Power would not impede any preliminary steps taken by the Commission with this object in view although such Councils could not exercise any authority prior to the date of the termination of the Mandate".

Answer to Ouestion 8.

No final agreements have yet been reached on economic matters in negotiations between the Commission and the

/Mandatory Power. Nevertheless

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4.

Mandatery Pewer. Nevertheless progress has been made towards agreement in some respects.

A serious and urgent matter now being negotiated with the Mandatory Power concerns the import of essential food products to Palestine after 15th May. The Commission has had representatives in London studying this problem with British officials and has now made specific proposals for the United Kingdom to import bread cereals and sugar under existing machinery to supply essential needs at least until 30th June. In view of the fact that a serious shortage will arise in Palestine after 15th May if supplies of bread cereals are not obtained immediately, the Mandatory Power has been asked to give a reply within a few days.

Preliminary discussions have begun with the Mandatery Pewer regarding the liquidation of assets.

The Mandatory Power excluded Palestine from the sterling area as of 22nd February and blocked Palestinian sterling balances held in London. This action was taken without the prior knowledge of the Commission. The consequences of this action are still under consideration by the Commission and will be the subject of direct negotiations with the Government of the United Kingdom. The Commission has agreed to appoint immediately an observer to the Palestine Currency Board, to serve in that capacity until 15th May.

No progress has yet been made regarding the problems of communications services, which will be ultimately the concern of the Economic Union, and the maintenance of fiscal continuity. To a considerable extent these problems call for close collaboration with local administrations.

Answer to Question 9.

The administration of the City of Jerusalem by the United Nations is possible if the plan of partition with economic union is generally accepted by the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine and peacefully implemented:

- (a) Jerusalem, as a City with a mixed pepulation, cannot be in peace if there is no peace between the two main communities.
- (b) The City being an enclave in Arab territory, depends for its essential supplies and its communications with the outside world on the good-will of its neighbours. Its water supply, its electricity supply, its food supply, depend on the good-will both of the proposed Arab and Jewish States.
- (c) The economy and finances of the City depend on the successful application of the plan of Economic Union,

/The City cannet be

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#### New York telegram No. 150 Saving to Fereign Office

5.

The City cannot be economically viable without Economic Union.

Answer to ouestien 10.

It is not possible to give an unequivocal answer to this question. Even assuming a peaceful implementation of the Plan as formulated by the General Assembly, the Palestine Commission, to which authority will be handed ever by the Mandatory Power, will require, prior to the termination of the Mandate, a working fund in order to undertake indispensable commitments. This fund could be acquired as a loan against future Palestinian revenues of the Economic Union. Moreover, the proposed arrangements for the City of Jerusalem, as envisaged in the Draft Statute formulated by the Trusteeship Council, will involve a continuing charge against the budget of the United Nations.

The fact that the transfer of administrative functions cannot be undertaken gradually, and begun well before the relinquishment of authority by the Mandatery Power, increases the amount of the werking fund which would be required from outside sources during the transitional period. Such a working fund should be clearly distinguished from the funds voted by the Assembly for the work of the Commission. The amount voted by the Assembly is for the expenses of the Commission and not for the administration of Palestine.

As regards administrative machinery, the gap created by the departure of British staff in key posts and the probable refusal of Arab personnel in minor posts to serve under the Commission will create great difficulties. New Personnel will have to be provided and their recruitment during the interim period, especially in the joint services, would be a responsibility of the Commission. The cost of maintenance of such personnel will be a charge on Palestine revenues.

[Ends].

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INWARD TELEGRAM.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

16

Cyphon (0. T.P.)

23 MAR 1948

FROM PATESTINE (General Sir A. Cumbingmon)

D. 20th March, 1948. R. 20th " 07.00 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 729 Top Secret and Personal.

Addressed S. of S. Repested UKDEL No. 770 (Washington please pass).

I have already sent you some comments on the possible security reactions to the latest U.S. proposal for interim trusteeship in Palestine. I send herewith some preliminary general observations on the political side. It was of course something of this sort I had in mind when I sent you my telegram No.637.

- S. I assume that even if asked to stey H.M. U. will adhere to its decision to give up the mandate on the 18th May. Under this condition there would not be sime before we last to conclude trusteening agreement as contemplated in charter, perticularly as this would involve consultation with interested states, to would appear that only elterrative would be some sort of special trustocalup similar to that of Jerusalem Statute recently completed. In order to save time I auggest that it might se found possible to adopt in different phraseclosy non-controversia: articlos of madate. I had at first thought that the mandate might be prolonged with suitable modifications, I consider largers; that this would have undesirable repercussions enong Araba, even if it was legully possible. In viou of the speed with which the deciment has to be produced I would suggest that it obuild be as brief as possible. Some arrangement would have to he made to start drafting at the earliest possible moment after the decurity Council have taken decision
- 3. If a trustocally administration is any in, either by a single power or by the Commission. whose them to merely interim administration of the concern and not implementation of or search for political releasing disorly our ettionde nowards it connot be the name as to the prosect Palestine Commission. In Sant we would fall in our duty to the U.M. and to relestine did we not give all essistence which it is an one power to alvo. I mustans that under no circumsument out we appead to luse a though here, but I feel that it would be mirround to retuse in told request to leave some Britann permanel. In this request is made I norgest that it would be nonship to saves that officers willing to do so should remain for limited passed in contein key gosts. I am aleas that it chosed be only showtest pushible time, and only long contents to tachte administrative althought to find their our plants should place absolute limit on two or there asolue and everthis only he econsity bondituone alles. I socked hor include police in this graposal. Very tache of present situation have required in a leak of confidence in those

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2. 0 1. AN 1913

on both sides through no facilitat their own, and it is plain that it would be most unfair to ask them to continue as formed body. I do not of course preclude voluntaers for whatever police force is formed by the successor authority.

the U.N. sends to govern the country (?during emitted) intering period I helieve the measure of lits success will be the degree committed to which it will be able to keep itself truly neutral and not this factor will be borne in wind. No doubt in its whether

S. Jowish reactions here have not yet orystallised but already we are accused of naving brought about the present eithation through machination having object of continuation of our rule of Palestins. If therefore it is still the intention not to alter our programme, from the security socie here the earlier announcement can be made that this new development will have no affect on it, the botter.

Distributs: to:-

R. 246

Secretary of State Bir T. Llord Wr. Roes-Williams Sir S. Caine Bly U. Jairrion Mr. Holding 别是一届·1925年的 ur. Tractoric smith Mr. Ontech Mr. Mathaemon ur. Dighas Mr. Callonwothy Hr. Hillowy Mr. Dale Foreign Office WON OFFISH (N.C. 4.)

· Mr. H. Beeloy. · Lt. Coi. W.M. Charberla.

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3

#### INWARD TELEGRAM.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

16 Embs

Cypher (O.T.P.)

3773 4 31

FROM PALESTIME (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

D. 22nd March, 1948.

22nd \* 19.15 hre.

IMMEDIATE

No. 732 Top Secret

Addressed to the S. of S. Repeated to UKDEL No. 781 (Washington please pase)

Further to my telegram No. 719 repeated to UKDEL No. 770.

The American plan for interim Government would have no chance of success unless a truce was first negotiated between contending parties in Palestine. I do not believe this will be possible unless matter is taken in hand at the earliest possible moment. There is strong pressure amongst one section of the Jews to intensify their attacks on Arabs, and strangely enough Arab attacks have if anything been rather heavier over the last two or three days. Whatever the medium may be through which it is proposed to negotiate a truce, in my view the venue must be in the Middle Mast itself. Neither Arabs nor Jews are in the mood to listen to long range exhortation from New York. I therefore suggest that it would be necessary to form some type of peace mission and that it should be sent to the Middle Hast at the earliest possible time.

- Ben Gurion and Mapai were pressing for immediate setting op of a Jewish Government. I therefore had conveyed to Jewish Agency yesterday a verbal message that they should consider very carefully the effect of any precipitate action of this kind. The message particularly hinted at the occounts sanctions it would be possible to apply. For your information a plan for applying such sanctions to being worked out in event of Agency heing so focilah as to try and usurp power. The Jews are entirely dependent on a continuous supply of oil. I myself consider that it is unlikely that they will pursue such a course.
- plan, if siepted and successful, has for us certain short term advantages. I must confess to vertous misgraings for the future. It may be that the only way now so arrive at a final solution of the Pelestine problem is for Araba solution to the Pelestine, and if that is the case the present proposals are only publing off the exil day. The position of N.H.O. will become the same as ours as Mandator over the past to years. This would seem dissettrous both for U.N.O. and polestine.

71 | 68

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12.

RECEIVED IN O.B. 25 MAR 1948 SENT TO DETT.

one of the major advantages of the American plan is that it would make it easier to deal with Jerusalem as a separate problem and no longer as part of partition plan. Whatever may come out of the next few weeks regarding Palestine as a whole, it is to be hoped that at the very least a plan for peace and stability in Jerusalem may emerge.

#### Distributed to: -

R. 243 Socretary of State Sir T. Lloyd Mr. Ress-Williams Sir S. Caine Sir C. Jeffries Mr. Holding Mr. Kartin Mr. Trafford Smith Mr. Gutch Mr. Mathicson Mr. Migham Mr. Galuworthy Mr. Holmer Mr. Dake Foreign Office War Office (M.O. 4.)

- wr. H. Beelsy - 114. Col. N.M. Charterin

si'i -	
1948	23 NAR 1948
Registry Number E3781/4/31  TELEGRAM FROM  Mr. Houston  No Boswall  BEIRUT  Dated  Received in Registry  22nd Mar 23rd "	Palestine, Arab League Political Committee.  Rfee s Beirut telegram No 212 (3736/4/31) of 19th Mar, Gives extracts from Communiqueread by Azzam Pasha to press correspondents March 21st,.  "Instructions were issued to the arab delegate at United Nations to announce to the world that the arab while determined to resist partition by all available means, were nethertheless prepared to co-operate in every way to help Palestine to attain its full independence as a unitary and democratis state to re-establish peace and security."
-Lust Paper.	The last centre includes some very unrealistic Rumands: the Muther No Emil are to Report knowlets and
References.	Piscolve the Hyanah!
1 / 1 1 / 1	H73. 227
8 Malhuman, Edith.  Aman Min  M. J. J.  Minds  Minds  Minds  Minds  Minds	
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En Clair

PCLITICAL DISTRIBUTION FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

23 MAR 1348 j

Mr. Houston Boswall No.221

D.6. O p.m. 22nd March, 1948. R.7.50 p.m. 22nd March, 1948.

22nd March, 1948.

Repeated to U.A. Delegation New York

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 221 of 22nd March. Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

Ty telegram No.212.

Arab League Political Committee.

Fellowing are extracts from Communiqué read by A zam Pasha to press correspondents on Parch 21st.

"Instructions were issued to the Arab Delegate at United Nations to announce to the world that the Arabs, while determined to resist partition by all available means, were nevertheless prepared to co-operate in every way to help Palestine to attain its full independence as a unitary and democratic state to re-establish peace and security. The Arab States consider that the Arabs of Palestine are in a state of legitimate defence. If therefore the United Nations were willing to deport the terrorists from Palestine, to dissolve the forces of Hagana and to prohibit immigration, which was supplying the latter with reinforcements, the Arabs would be willing to do their utmost to establish peace in Palestine in a democratic manner.

Full text follows by bag.

Please pass to United Kingdom Delegation as my telegram No.7.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York]

ВВВ

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320		Se C
	E	25 MAR 1548
15.30		25 MAR 1548
Dated to Mr. Furl	two months we should confi fice of intention not to get	iggested reply to bade vs three times in the last ine reply to a re-statment devolved in implementation execution being what it to encourage others to do
Last Paper.	(Minutes.)	<del></del> .
s 781	In P.P. John Menule	
References.	- 41 Minute MA Acel	D-Balfun
(Print.)		HB. 25)
(Action completed.)		
Next Paper.	F26513 F.O.P.	
* /		

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

FO 371

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Reference:-

DOCTOR EVATT AND PALESTINE On the attached copy of telegram No.65 from the Australian Government to the C.R.O., the Secretary of State has minuted to the effect that a full reply should be sent to Doctor Evatt about Palestine. Doctor Evatt's telegram is largely a repetition of his earlier telegram on the same subject to which we replied in C.R.O. telegram to the Australian Government No. 75. (Flag A within.) Since Doctor Evatt's second telegram. was received, the Palestine situation has been radically altered by the reversal of American policy, and the controversy in these telegrams is now out of date. In these circumstances the Secretary of State may feel that it is unnecessary to continue the controversy. 22nd March, 1948. Mª Beeley has so informed CRO.

No astern requires

GUSF 23/3

85

Couronmerlum Talations Office,

F.2781/11-. Secret

Doming fitz et. 17th Here', 1948. [1] 3540

Pear Furlonge,

25 MAR 1948

Tith enforcements our telephone conversation a fundance, I enclose, for consideration in the Foreign Office, a suggested draft reply to the Justicalian Government's relepton Jo. 57 of 11th Morch.

1. There is a good find which light we solid in rely to the remarks in the Adstralian telegrat, but we have a beenly stated our views to the funtralian Covernment three times in the last two months, over and shove the enemal telegrams to all the and above the energh telegroms to all the Dominions, and we should prefer to bring the correspondence to a close. "e therefore think that the raply should be confined to a re-statement of our intention not to get involved in implementation and an explanation flat. our fixed policy being what it is, we do not feel able to encourage others to do what we are not propaged to do ourselves.

3. I am sending a copy of the draft to Martin (Colonial Office)

and

G. W. FUT LONGE, FEQ.

FOREICH OFFICE.

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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and should be clad if he build inform me of his comments or concurrence.

yours miced, Joshanna

(G.E.B. Shannon)

2 + Mark 1948

FO 371 68539

Subject to Foreign Office Colonial Office concurrence.

TELEGRAM (TYPEX)

EXTERNAL CANBERRA

Distribution 1.

NO. SECRET.

Your telegram 11th March No.65.
Paragraph 3.

Palestine.

Our attitude on question of implementation has always been that, while we are ready to assume responsibility for giving effect to any plan mutually agreed by Arabs and Jews, and would not (repeat not) obstruct Assembly's plan, we are determined to take no (repeat no) active part in implementation of any solution not (repeat not) acceptable to both parties.

discharge our obligations under the mandate to facilitate the growth of the Jewish National Home and to protect the interests of the Arab population. Despite our consistent endeavours and despite the efforts made by the Foreign Secretary in 1945 and subsequently by the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry, it proved impossible, through no fault of

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our

our own, to draw up a settlement acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. We accordingly referred the question to Assembly. After our long association with administration of Palestine, our position is necessarily different from that of other members of U.N. If we were to become involved in any settlement unacceptable to both sides, we should only be accused by one side or the other of partiality, without ensuring advantage of a lasting settlement.

not (repeat not) escape criticism,
but we feel sure that we shall
not be misunderstood in saying
that we do not feel able to take any
part in securing implementation
by others, when we are not (repeat
not) prepared to take part in
implementation ourselves.

OGRAPHICALLY WITH-OF THE PUBLIC LONDON This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate is to persons outside British and United States Government Services.

ions Office was a full

Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office with should

ALLOTTED TO F.A. & U.N.DEPT.

alestre I do hir know the supple he mens about Epple

CYPHER (TYPEX)

FROM: AUSTRALIA (GOVT.)

D. Canberra lith Mar., 1948. 5.50 p.m. R. 11th " 12.0 p.m.

No. 65

Palestine.

Your tolegram of 5th March No.75.

We are glad to receive the assurance that the United Kingdom has endeavoured to impress upon the Arabs their responsibility towards the Middle Mast as a whole, and towards Palestine in particular. We regret, however, that the United Kingdom does not see its way clear to adopt a similar attitude in treaty negotiations with the Egyptian and other Governments. For our part we regard our commitments to the United Nations as the overriding factor in our foreign policy and from the point of view of British Commonwealth interests in the Middle East no greater mistake could be made than prejudicing in any way successful fulfilment of the United Nations decision in respect of Palestine.

- 2. It would be a welcome example of the sincerity of the Western Powers stated respect for the United Nations if the United Kingdom were able to persuade the Arab States that they should not obstruct the implementation of the General Assembly recommendations.
- Kingdom did not support the Assembly's recommendation for the partition of Palestine, we hope the United Kingdom will not fail to assist in securing the implementation of the decision of the majority of members of the United Nations.

Copy to:-/

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Mr. D.W.Hunt
Mr. B. Cockram
P.S. to Secretary of State
Sir Noel Charles
Mr. H. Beeley
Mr. G.W.Furlonge
Mr. G.J.McDermott
e Mr. J.H.Martin
Mr. R.R.Powell C.R.O.(A) New York Foreign Office Colonial Office M/Defence

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 68539

1. 3620 POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION. 25 WAR 1948

Cypher/OTP

PROM AMMAI TO FOREIGH OFFICE.

Sir A. Kirkbride. D. 11.10 a.m. Lord March, 1940. No. 179. 23rd march, 1948. R. 2.54 p.m. 25rd march, 1948. Repeated Saving to Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, B.M.J.O. and Jerusalem.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to.F.O. telegram No. 179 of march 25rd, repeated for information saving magdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, British Middle Mast Office and Jerusalem.

Palestine.

The first reactions here to the announcement that the United States would no longer support scheme to partition Palestine were triumphant but a little reflection brought home the fact that this decision had settledlittle of the problems of the future of Palestine.

- 2. It was suggested frequently that Great Britain might agree to postpone relinquishment of the mandate. This is not as complimentary to us as it sounds. It arises from realization that the Jews are not likely to submit to the loss of their State and that there must be some outside authority to prevent a Jewish coup d'etat and to stop illegal immigration. Announcement that Arabs would accept trusteeship comes from the same considerations. To the arabs trusteeship means that Jews will not be allowed to form their State or to import more than a limited number of immigrants. It will give the Arabs time to strengthen their preparations for a further trial of strength as the present effort is thought to have gone badly.
- 5. It is anticipated that on or before may 15th the Jews will form a State of the areas of Falestine in which they predominate and that hostilities between Jews and Arabs will continue but with the difference that the Jews will be opposing a united Mations trusteeship to which the Arabs have agreed in principle.

[Copy sent to .... Secretariat].

685

\$ 1 h

19.48
Registry Number E5382/4/31  TELEGRAM FROM  United Kingdom  No. Delegation  Dated NEW YORK  Received 1 in Registry 24th March 25th "
Last Paper.
References.
(Print.)
Mail woon. E.C.  Sherman, Eal Aff  Schen. M.1.5  M.1.3a.  M.O.4  Admy  G.M.  Mar. 25
(Action (Index)) completed.)

322

E 3582

#### Security Council Meetings.

Refers New York telegram No, 935 dated March 19th (E3735/4/31). Security Council held an inconclusive meeting morning March 24th and adjourned discussion till afternoon of March 30th.

Paris, (Syria) read a letter from christian communities in Falestine expressing indignation at situation resulting from Partition lian and urging that it be revoked.

Gives texts of other speeches.

(Minutes.)
25/3

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En Clair

#### WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

#### FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 972.

D. 9.0. p.m. 24th March 1948.

24th March 1948.

R. 3.45. s.m. 25th Merch 1948.

Repeated to Jerusalem, Washington, Saving.

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

25 MAR 1948

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 972 of 24th repeated for information to Jerusalem and saving to Washington.

My telegram No. 935; Palestine.

Security Council held an inconclusive meeting this morning and adjourned discussion till afternoon of March 30th.

- 2. Faris (Syria) read a letter from Christian communities in Palestine expressing indignation at situation resulting from partition plan and urging that it be revoked.
- 3. McNaughton (Canada) in a somewhat gloomy review of past developments said that Assembly plan had been based on a number of assumptions which had proved to be false viz
- (A) That both communities in Palestine would cooperate sufficiently;
- (B) That Mandatory Power would assist in implementation and at least supervise transitional arrangements;
- (C) That plan would not be opposed by any members of United Nations, including those who had voted against;
- (D) That transfer of authority would be rapid and progressive, role of United Nations Commission being simply to assist and superintend;
- (E) That agreement would be reached in Security Council as to any necessary implementation measures.

/4. In present situation

685

-2-

In present situation, and failing some alternative authority in Palestine, civil war would break out and peace of whole Middle East would be endangered. New United States plan might be opposed by both sides on ground that it imposed further tutelage and postponed independence. It would, however, provide a cooling off period during which moderates would have opportunity to work out a settlement by direct negotiation. Canadian Delegation was prepared to consider an alternative plan to partition, but feared serious difficulties in absence of any assurance of cooperation from countries most directly concerned. Unless and until those countries showed signs of intention to cooperate, his Delegation could not declare itself in Payour of any course.

5. Parodi (France) recalled his Government's position in favour of conciliation and said that to this extent he welcomed United States proposal.

Trusteeship, however, raised serious problems, e.g. as to meaning of "States directly concerned". Moreover, it would be hard to find a State or States to take on trusteeship, and United Nations had no experience of administering trust territoties. United States plan should not be adopted unless there was some clear indication of the outcome. Security Council debates had not increased its prestige, and authority of assembly might likewise be diminished if a Special assembly were decided on without a clear policy and unless a majority for trusteeship could be foreseen.

States' plan should be stressed. Any trusteeship agreement should set up Jewish and Arab cantons, possibly with provisional agreement as to immigration and without prejudice to ultimate solution, whether partition or a unitary State. He shared difficulty of Canadian representative in making up his mind in present circumstances and suggested a closed meeting at which, after questioning United States' representative on details of his proposal, Council should consider whether to take the responsibility of asking for a special Assembly.

7. Chamoun (Lebanon) said that Council could not give a mandate to the Assembly, which would be free to adopt or reject trusteeship or adhere to partition plan as it wished. Detailed study of trusteeship proposals

/at this stage was, therefore,

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#### New York telegram No. 972 to Foreign Office

-3-

at this stage was, therefore, premature. He added

- (A) That Arab States were ready to ask Palestine Arabs to cease hostilities if recommendation for a special Assembly were adopted by the Council provided there was no Zionist provocation either by Jewish population in Palestine or Jewish Organisations:
- (B) If a special Assembly were convoked, Lebenese delegation would be prepared to discuss in good will any proposal which did not delay democratic independence of whole of Palestine.
- 8. Lopez (Colombia) unsuccessfully renewed his suggestion (my telegram 784 paragraph 6) that there should be an adjournment to permit permanent members to consult among themselves and with representatives of Jews and arabs. He expressed ironic satisfaction at assurance of President (Tsiang China) that such consultations were unlikely to produce any results.
- 9. Silver (Jewish Agency) said that he would not discuss United States' proposal as it had not (repeat not) been formally submitted. He then read out statement dated March [gp. omitted] by Jewish agency and Vaad Leumi (text of which is no doubt available to you) as to proclamation of a Jewish State immediately after May 15th.
- 10. Fawzi (Egypt) said that the Arabs would not swallow partition on any terms. He would not now comment on United States' plan, but any proposal involving suspension of partition plan was in the right direction.
  - 11. See my immediately following telegram.

Please repeat to Jerusalem important as my telegram No. 240.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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## PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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
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**TO** 371

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CYPHER/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

# FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 990.

D: 2.00 p.m. 27th March, 1948.

27th March, 1948.

R: 8.20 p.m. 27th March, 1948.

IMPORTANT

SECRET

Addressed Jerusalem telegram No. 244 March 27th repeated for information Important to Foreign Office (for Colonial Office) and Saving to Washington.

Your telegram to Colonial Office No. 673 repeated here as No. 730. Paragraph 4. Police force for Jerusalem.

Following for Gurney from Fletcher-Cooke.

[Begins]

Commission is at present unable (repeat unable) to estimate total strength of police force which it will be necessary to have in Jerusalem after 15th May. [Ends]

Foreign Office please pass Important to Jerusalem. [Copies sent to Colonial Office, and to Telegraph Section Colonial for repetition to Jerusalem]

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1945

Registry Number \E3926/4/51

FROM Colonial Office commd.

No. 713

Dated 20.3.48
Received in Registry 29.3.48

New Proposal for U.N. Trusteeship for Palestine
Transmits copybof telegram No.713 of 20th
March from Jerusalem to Colonial Office regarding
the new proposal for trusteeship of Palestine.

Last Paper.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

A very interesting analysis. It does not look as if
there is much hope of interim trusteering heary accepted.

See corporably paragrammented in pain 4 and compare para

5. It is expected that a Zimist meeting on april

4th at tel arise will protuce a Reisian for or against

the proclamation of an independent general state. Even of only

the principle is proclaimed and its application left till

some fixed a unspecified date in the future, the areal

Liberation army may react by starting a large-scale

Civil was well before they is the

D. Ballows

73.4

(Action completed.)

Next Paper.

(Index.)

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INWARD TELEGRAM.

#### TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

16 02 Enter som

This decument must be paraphresed if the commuteation of its contents to any person outside Gavernous Service to

Oyphar

11 0020

PROSE PALEBITINE (Gen. Sir A. 29a MAR an 1948)

D. 20th March, 1948.

21.30 me.

No. 713 Top Secret

Addressed to 8. of W. Repeated to UKDEL, No. 765 (Washington please).

I am telegraphing separately some comments or the breader aspects of the new proposal for I.E. Trusteeship for Palestine but you (7 may omitted) like to here at once the following cheerwhims on possible Arab and Jewish reactions in Palestine.

The proposals for an interim tensiocehip buring re-exemination of the problem would be acceptable to erabs provided that the following stipulations on which they are likely to insist are met:-

- (a) that invetesship about be simble by N.N. Though or by a group of shaten not predominously "pro-Newish". If the latter, at least one state to be a state of the Arab League.
- (b) that the period of interim brusteening shall not operate to strongthen the Jewish military position at the expense of the Arabs. (It would empures Arab scoepishes were the U.S. to suncupae that it sould establish the same embayed for the pariod of trusteening).
- (1) that Jewish hesignation will not be impressed. (the Anaba would require considerable parameter to compt will reseive of the cost of the cost of bucology then there).
- (a) that guarantes will be given that illegal imalgrants will be impossioned from currying Falsactus.

The Areb Bigher Committee, while and means admitted the Englate of trustmenting principles, while an absence the rejected any trustmenting proposed on principle. The present mereunalences, as a constitute for an objection, the present mereunalences, as a constitute from the following admitted from the feature of the factor of the proposed of the factor of the proposed of the following persons and the factor of the fact

Tak tak be tar

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IGHT PHOTOGRAPH - NOT TO I DUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WI ERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC D OFFICE, LONDON RECEIVED IN C.B.
2 9 MAR 1949
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unlikely the LA,H,C. could mobilize substantial physical replactance if the proposal wars accepted by the Arab Lasgue. The Arab Libration Army as a whole, if not withdraws, is believed to be sufficiently under the control of the Arab, League to remain quisscent during the period of trusteeship provided the Jews are also quiescent. Acts of violeror by irrespondible elements are likely to continue for ease sime.

- The labour chere must be a corresponding effect on the Arabac The labour will correspond non remain passive if welselved either according to the process either according to be by levely elements. Even proclementor of a few about the matter way he enough in the state of a matter broken proposed may then evolve on much the usual lines as it would otherwise have done after 15th May, unless the sides.
- It is mulikely that new developments would so much impary the enthority of the Skrien Agency se to make it wishis do outre and Astaboa in a miris district the better of coloration of the proposite, and in inclusions on the obely establishment of a period state in the limits analysed by his U.S. renolution: The dear regard the reschilden of 29% Butamber, 1947, as in targett skulpe in the etc. . Edwin to akker it. valuete edwiner. sand att an iO. Mill anvenue diseased the initial data to ado friede and that during regions to the Televis of the larish Since who love side of the Agency is to the communic to Divisor eranda da la calcamación de como moderno de como de co treateratic proposal, carryner as it deci at Tillerich Torest the the the liberium of design expectations, way andres fill a contant of traditions and traditional that the Apency (no Senda where E. Pargos to presence from H & O.) will proudling the authing the many of the control of the angles of the state of the whele to so in the spicing and it might be that it would wash areal the ord of the Mandate. Haring taken such a nosp four souls no double proposed to except the application to their bet then Gerstonesse the sile or one of pales ins where device read could improve its.
- The Claridants, who have always producted that U.W. would no comble to enferon their declaism; and that if a Texts Biolo is to come into existence it must be by the force of resist simply for likely to goth in prictige and edictions the status parties of the vicinity of the the victure parties Personal termination in the properties of the properties by oly - combelled or locating a link or escionate presumence - there a while ាល នៃសម្ពីទី១ ប្រទះ ១ ១០១១០ ភ្នំ១០ បំពី និស្សា ខែនិងទី១ និស្សាស្រែក្នុំកំពុំកំពុំកំពុំកំពុំកំពុំកំពុំក្នុងភ្នំ PROTERUS OF ANGLES SESSIONEN DE DE COMPANIES DE CONTRA CON Applications and this being a constitution and the constitutions and the constitutions and the constitution of the constitutio amother the armos wire the object of othermann, the lating that well added class plants he to move to terms with a community ARTHUR AND ACTUAL FOR MICE CONTROL OF CONTRO profitations of the contract of the contract of the parties of the parties and the contract of BOTH BY BELLING THOUSE STOCKED CASHEY, STREET BY THE PROPERTY ាស្ត្រីប្រជាពល់ដែលដីស្តីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត្រីស្ត

## INWARD TELEGRAM.

## TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

arms believed to be already coers sed in Marope.

be laid on His Majesty's Government - indeed the Jewish press has been suggesting for some time that His Majesty's Covernment - indeed the Majesty's Covernment have been working to this end. The Agency, however, may be expected to be prodominantly influenced by the necessity for avoiding a second front against Pritiab Torces. Moreover although, initially, enti-Aritish continents may be intensified, the strongest recling will be against the U.S. on when the everage few has hitherto placed most relience. Relatively the pre-Russian faction may at least temporarily strongthen its position, but it seems quite likely that long-torm tendency will lactine to the weimanne thesis that Pritish Criendship is essential to the realisation of Jewish sing.

The view of linguished to agreement - one of whose principal provisions is thought to be the discouring ance of the infter's stracks on British Tarces - reprisols for the part altributed to His bajesty's Covered to be part altributed to His bajesty's confined to the Stern Group. Since the licker to new ballows to be under Russian direction and has no cooks in America. I. C. endervours to committee it are unlikely to be allow by any

Becker of Space
Sic I. Though
Mr. Reco-Williams
Sir C. Jeffeles
Mr. Moldang
Mr. Mertin
Foreign Office
War Office (M.O.4.)
Cabinet Offices

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Mr. H. Beeley. Lt. Col. Charteris. Col. Sherman.

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

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## FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 994.

D: 3.47 p.m.27th March, 1948.

27th March, 1948.

R: 10.00 p.m.27th March, 1948.

ILEDIATE

F3939

TOP SECRET

Please pass following to Jerusalem.

[Begins]

Addressed High Commissioner Jerusalem telegram No. 247. Your telegram No. 807.

Following for Gurney from Fletcher-Cooke.

[Begins]

My personal opinion is that Commission will be unable (repeat unable) to carry out their task under the Assembly plan. They have, in fact, informed the Security Council that they cannot (repeat not) do so without a force to implement partition and it is clear that the prospects of a force to implement partition are negligible.

- 2. However, until the plan is revoked or varied by another decision of the Assembly it stands, and the Commission, so long as they are in being, are bound by it and by such directions as the Security Council may give them under paragraph 14 of Section B of Part I of the plan.
- J. The Security Council cannot (repeat not) revoke the Assembly plan but legal adviser here considers that Council have powers, under paragraph 14 referred to above, to suspend the Commission's activities as contemplated in the latest United States proposal.
- 4. The longer the present uncertainty exists, the less likely is it that a trusteeship administration can come into being on the 16th May, but I am advised that if a decision to refer the matter back to a special Assembly were taken by the Security Council next week, and if the necessary preparatory work were done by the powers chiefly concerned including the United States and ourselves, before the Assembly meet, and if any proposals which emerge from such preparatory work were approved by the Assembly without undue delay, it might (repeat might) be just possible for a trusteeship administration to come into being on the 16th May.

/5. I appreciate that

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New York telegram No. 994 to Foreign Office.

- 2 -

5. I appreciate that these observations do not (repeat not) answer your questions which are presumably designed to ascertain whether it can definitely be stated now (repeat now) that there will be no (repeat no) United Nations authority in Palestine to take over the administration on the 16th May, but the uncertainty here is such that these questions cannot (repeat not) be answered until the Security Council meets on the 30th March and possibly not (repeat not) even then.

6. I will telegraph again after Security Council meeting. I am sending copies of these telegrams to Martin by bag.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem]

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THE PUBLIC

E 3955

Registry Number E3955/4/51

**FROM** 

No.

Chancery MASHILGTOL 41 /49/48

Dated Received in Registry

22na March 30th 1

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United States Trusteeship Prossal.

Discusses United States in tial press and wireless comment about the new United States projectlifor a temporary trustmeship in Palestine.

Generally, the recention of the proposal has been bad, Criticism is directed less a gainst the proposal itzeli than against the vacialations or United State policy and the tandenc, of the idministration to view every international issue through anti-s viet spectacles.

(Minutes.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

68539

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

Ref: 413/49/48

22nd march, 1948.

Dear Department,

A report will shortly be sent to the Foreign Office on initial press and wireless comment about the new United States proposal for a temporary trusteeship in Falestine. Suffice it to say for the present that the reception of the proposal has been bad. Criticism is, however, directed less against the proposal itself than against the vacillations of United States policy and the tendency of the Administration to view every international issue solely through anti-Soviet spectacles.

Pirst comments from Congress were also predominantly critical though there were a few voices to be heard on the other side. Senator Taft contended that the United States should have stood firm on partition. If the new plan were accepted, he continued, the Security Council would have to send an armed force to Palestine to support the trusteeship and all the objections raised by the Administration to the use of armed force to implement partition would apply just as strongly to this proposal. Senators Ives (R., New York), Ferguson (R., kichigan), Lucas (D., Illinois), and Representatives Klein (D., New York), Bloom (D., New York), Celler (D., New York) also expressed surprise and shock. On the other hand, Senators Gurney (R., South Dakota), Chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, Elbert Thomas (D., Utah) and Representative Gossett (D., Texas) approved of the new move.

American Zionists were, of course, dismayed. At a special session of the National Administrative

/Council

Mastern Department, Foreign Office, LONDON, 3.4.1.

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Council of the Zionist Organization of America on the 21st March, Dr. Silver asserted that the new proposal would place the United States Government in the position of fighting the Jews in Palestine. This was unthinkable but he had seen many unthinkable things happen in this crazy world. He attacked Mr. Marshall's statement at Los Angeles as leaving much to be desired as to fact and accuracy. To suggest that the failure of the Security Council to accept partition as a basis for action on the 5th March and that failure of the principal powers to agree thereon were responsible, was, he said, to obscure the role played by the United States from the beginning. This was, in fact, to scuttle the partition plan, reopen the whole issue, and manoeuvre for a new Assembly meeting. To represent the United States as the champion of partition was fantastic. The oil interests had organised a campaign to defeat partition with the enthusiastic support of Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Marshall, Mr. Lovett, Mr. Loy Henderson and Mr. Norman Armour. This group had finally persuaded the President.

The trusteeship was, he continued, an old proposal and had been rejected. It was merely a continuation of the mandate and was comparable to the British White Paper of 1939. It made no difference what national uniforms the soldiers of the trustee would wear. The only question was who would be on the other side of the barbed wire. The United States only wanted a trusteeship because the Soviet Union would not participate therein. But the "states directly concerned" would include Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt as well as Great Britain, and he prophesied that Great Britain would be there, either alone or with other states.

The only logical thing to be done was to proclaim a Jewish State in Palestine. The judgment

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of the Jews in Palestine was awaited as to whether they were strong enough to back up such a proclamation.

- Dr. Neumann, president of the Zionist Organization of America, also spoke at this meeting. He said that it was not yet too late for President Truman to shake himself loose from this conspiracy fostered by oil profiteers. The President should be aware that the logic of the position assumed by the State Department might yet lead to the employment of an international force headed by the United States, not against the Hitlerite Mufti and his hired cutthroats, but with these assasins and against the Jews of Palestine who were the only bastion of democracy in the Near East. The President could go along with this plan of genocide or restore United States national rolicy to the course which he had himself charted and supported hitherto. The decent instincts of the American people were revolted by this ugly betrayal and there was, he concluded, a mounting chorus of condemnation which demanded that the administration return forthwith to the path of honour and decency.
- A number of other Zionist and Jewish organisation, amongst which were the American Jewish Conference, the American Jewish Congress, and B'nai B'rith have also attacked the new United States proposal. Speakers for all of these castigated United States policy on much the same lines as Dr. Silver and were chiefly concerned with what they called the underhand way in which the new proposals had been worked out and put forward.
- 8. We are sending a copy of this letter to the United Kingdom Delegation, New York.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

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1948	PALESTINE	30 MAR 1048		
	Palestine, instructions to Sir Alexander			
Registry Number E595/4/51		Jadogan.		
FROM Foreign Office Minute No.	Discussions instructions to be sent to dir, Alex naer Cadogan with regard to Security Jouncil voting on the recent United States Resolution.			
Sir, Orme Sulger Dated	nt.			
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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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30 MAR 1948

Instructions for Gir A. Cadogan.

PALESTINE

The Security Council will shortly be called upon to vote on the various parts of a complicated American resolution. It will be necessary to instruct Sir A. Cadogan before the vote takes place, and since it is just possible that this will happen at the next Meeting of the Security Council on Wednesday 24th March, it will be desirable to telegraph instructions not later than the morning of that day.

We do not yet know the final form in which the American resolution will be presented to the Security Council: but it seems possible that separate votes will be taken on the following proposals:-

(i) That the Security Council should

- take action to bring about a truce. (ii) That the Security Council should request the Secretary-General to convene a special session of the General Assembly. (iii) That the Security Council should
- recommend to the Assembly the establishment of an interim United Nations Trusteeship for Palestine.
- (iv) That the Palestine Commission should meanwhile suspend its activities.
- (v) That the question of Palestine should be removed from the Agenda of the Security Council (thus enabling the Assembly to make recommendations.)

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During the two sessions of the General Assembly which have dealt with Palestine, the United Kingdom Delegation have consistently abstained from voting. There is obviously much to be said for continuing to abstain now that the matter is before the Security Council. But it has to be remembered that, owing to the rules for voting in the Security Council, an abstention there is indistinguishable in its effect from a negative vote. In normal circumstances (that is to say when the veto is not used), a proposal in the Security Council needs seven affirmative votes. An abstention, therefore, reduces its chances to exactly the same extent as a negative vote. It follows that, if the United Kingdom Delegation abstains on the American proposals, effect be opposing of preventing their adoption

Resolution would thus seem to be a most emphatic rejection of the United States Government's plea for our support. In fact it is theoretically possible that the abstention of the United Kingdom Delegation might be the decisive vote in a defeat of the new American policy. In determining the attitude which the Delegation should adopt, we have therefore to balance the advantages of absolute formal neutrality against the disadvantages of acting in a way which might jeopardize the success of the new American initiative. This would be undesirable, not only because we do not wish to be associated with the Soviet Unificon in opposition to the United States Government on this

issue /

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isque, but also because certain of the American proposals constitute from our point of view an important stop in the right direction. The proposals to suspend action on the partition plans, to call for a truce and to reconvene the Assembly, offer indeed the only practicable way out of the present deadlock. 5. But It is difficult to see how we could justify a vote in favour of an interim United Nations trustee hip over Palestine (point (iii) in paragraph 2 above). We have hitherto refused to recommend, sponsor, or in any way support or oppose any substantive proposal for the future Government of Palestine.

There are, however, parts of the American Resolution to which this objection would not apply with equal force. These are the call for a truce, the request for a special session of the Assembly and the removal of the question from the Agenda of the Security Council (points 1, 2 and 5 in paragraph 2 above). It might indeed be difficult to justify an abstention on the proposal for a truce, particularly in view of the fact that an abstention would have exactly the same effect as a negative vote. Furthermore, it is for consideration whether Sir A. Cadogan should not endeavour to secure, preferably on the initiative of some other Delegation, the insertion of a specific reference to Jerusalem in the truce proposal. The proposal to convene a special session of the Assembly is the heart of the new American policy, and it is perhaps on this point especially that they will hope for our support. The removal of the item from the

Security /

Security Council's Agenda would be a consequential aecision.

A more difficult case is presented by the proposal that the Security Council should instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its activity. If this proposal were defeated, while at the same time the proposal to convene a special session of the Assembly were carried, the Commission would be in a somewhat awkward situation. Their difficulties, however, would be of a procedural kind, and it is unlikely that they would in fact seriously complicate the situation. It is suggested that the overriding consideration here is that a vote in favour of this part of the American Resolution would amount to a more direct vote against partition than would support of those parts of the Resolution mentioned in paragraph 6 above, and that Sir A. Cadogan should therefore abstain.

- It is therefore recommended:-
  - (a) That Sir A. Cadogan be instructed to abstain from voting on points iii and iv in paragraph 2 above.
  - (b) That he should be instruct d to vote in favour of points i, ii and v in paragraph 2 above.

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I do not like our getting mixed up in this proposal for a truce. A simple appeal to both states to stop scrapping would have no result. It would have to be followed up

by/

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by meetings, discussions and negotiations which, I fear, in their turn are bound to prove abortive.

If meanwhile we have voted for a truce we should be compelled to take our share in trying to bring it about and this would mean participating in all the useless negotiations which this would involve and, what is worse, we should be told that since we are thus working for a truce we clearly cannot remove our adminstration in Palestine and that in fact without the help of our administration it would be impossible to carry out the Security Council's resolution calling for a truce.

I do not think therefore that we should in any way identify ourselves with the idea of a truce and I would suggest that Sir A. Cadogan should only vote for points (ii) and (v).

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23rd Harch, 1948

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